Technical and Vocational Education and Training Sub-Sector Report

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1 Introduction

"Dream big. Start small. But most of all ... start."

1.1 Methodology

The work begins with literature review. Nearly 30 documents were gathered to gain an understanding of the TVET sub-sector in Afghanistan. Some documents apparently have more weight than others. One has to bear in mind where they come from (e.g. Ministry documents vs. consultant reports) and their current status (e.g. approved and published government documents vs. draft version). The initial challenge is to sort and determine their level of importance.

Approved government documents are important. These are the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS), the National Education Strategic Plan (NESP), the National Education Interim Plan (NEIP), and the National Action Plan for Women in Afghanistan (NAPWA). The National Skills Development Program (NSDP) Strategy is a “draft” document being used as basis for the NSDP implementation since 2007. This seems to be the final version of the document as it has the signature of then Minister of MOLSAMD. These documents serve as undisputable source of information because they have the government’s seal of approval.

Some documents are still in draft form. They may or may not change during the consultation process. Hence, draft plan like the Strategic Plan of the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and the Disabled (MOLSAMD), the National Priority Program 1: Sustainable Decent Work through Skills Development and Employment Policies for Job-Rich Growth and the National Technical-Vocational Education and Training (TVET) Strategy for Afghanistan can only provide good indication of the positions and ideas that may still evolve.

Donor studies and consultant reports provide external perspectives and analyses but they should be considered as they are: “external” until they permeate into the consciousness of government planners and policymakers. The 2010 Education Sector Analysis by Adam Smith International and Towards a Viable National Vocational Education and Training System by Michael Sachsse, both good reports with sensible if not practical recommendations, but are at risk of being forgotten.

Inventory of TVET providers gives a broad picture of what really exists in the country. Three important documents were particularly useful: the NSDP-funded Baseline Data for the Quality of TVET Provision in Afghanistan (May 2009), the USAID-funded Afghanistan Technical and Vocational Education Training (TVET) Providers Inventory (November 2011), and GIZ-funded Baseline on TVET Schools/Institutes (February 2012).

This report prioritized data from approved government documents (e.g. ANDS, NESP and NEIP) as well as statistics directly from government ministries (e.g. MOE, DMTVET, MOLSAMD and NSDP). However, gathering reliable data at present is understandably difficult. Capacities of government ministries to collect and analyze data are still developing. Alternative sources (e.g. donor-funded studies and consultant reports) were used only in cases where primary data from the ministries are not available.

Deeper understanding of the issues in the TVET sub-sector is only possible by meeting the key stakeholders. More than 30 people were interviewed during the period of May 2 to June 9, 2012. This report would be incomplete if the main actors are not consulted, namely: MOE-DMTVET, MOLSAMD and NSDP. Meetings with these organizations happened more than once. In general, these meetings aim to:

1 Simon Sinek
• Validate information gathered from literature review;
• Understand institutional mandates and activities relating to TVET;
• Find existing, especially unreported, initiatives and projects;
• Gather available statistics and validate if necessary;
• Know future direction of policies and plans;
• Identify issues regarding implementation and coordination;
• Get suggestions to move forward towards a better TVET sub-sector; and
• Discover possible areas for collaboration among agencies involved.

Actual site visits to TVET institutions and workshops are equally important. There is an unwritten rule in TVET not to trust the man who has not been inside a training workshop. Only the person who is aware of the problems and challenges inside TVET institutions can truly assess the situation and make the right recommendations. The following institutions were visited in Kabul:

i. Afghanistan-Korea Vocational Training Center in Afshar-e-silo;
ii. National Agricultural Education Center (NAEC) in Chelsetun;
iii. Afghanistan National Institute of Music (ANIM) in Deh Bori; and

A field visit to the Panjsher province further added “reality” to this report. While it merely confirmed the situation of many TVET institutions already written in reports, it brought new light to a number of issues that would not have been highlighted if the observations were limited to Kabul only. In other words, Kabul does not fully represent or capture the situation and challenges experienced by the rest of the country.

The report thinks it is a great way to simplify a complex situation like the TVET subsector by following a suggestion from the NEIP. According to the document, the MOE conducted an assessment of its internal and external environment, and found out it needs to focus on three areas, namely: i) System (build a system of policies, procedures and standards); ii) HR Capacity (increase the capacity and sustainability of human resources); and iii) Service Delivery (provide safe and on-time delivery of education services).²

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² NEIP, Section 10.2 The Way Forward, p.68
associations to be involved in the development of future workers, it can fall under “system” but also “HR”, while discussion on teachers can also be “HR” or “service delivery”. This might explain why TVET is sometimes called confusing because of the gray areas where people tend to disagree on their perspective of organizing the TVET subsector.

Figure 2. Linked Areas of the TVET System

2 Current situation

It is better to go slowly in the right direction than to go speeding in the wrong direction.

2.1 Policies and Plans

Policies and strategies on TVET are found in at least five government plans. These are:

i. Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS)
ii. National Education Strategic Plan (NESP)
iii. National Education Interim Plan (NEIP)
iv. National Skills Development Program (NSDP)

The ANDS provides the general vision for all to follow. For education and training, the ANDS envisions that “all Afghans will have equal access to quality education to enable them to develop their knowledge and skills and thereby maximize their potential. An education sector that engenders a healthy workforce with relevant skills and knowledge is a key to long-term economic growth”. The ANDS mentions two other important things that are critical to the future of TVET. These pertain to: i) the importance of engaging the private sector to generate competitiveness and enhance quality of education services and ii) the creation of the National Vocational Education and Training Board (NVETB) that would set minimum core competencies for courses, carry out accreditation and inspect vocational institutions to ensure that they meet minimum standards.

The NESP and NEIP are plans of the Ministry of Education (MOE). Both documents contain almost the same thing. The only difference is that NEIP provides adjusted and realistic MOE

3 Simon Sinek
4 ANDS, p.113
5 ANDS, pp.117-118
target for 2011-2013. (For this reason, this report uses the NEIP as basis for reviewing TVET’s 2011 performance).

The MOE objectives for TVET, as indicated in the NEIP, are to:

a. Increase access to TVET by increasing the number of TVET regional institutes from 16 to 24; TVET provincial schools from 46 to 61; and establishing 87 TVET district schools
b. Increase enrolment from 29,600 to 67,300 (30% girls)
c. Develop basic skills of teachers to improve the quality of teaching and increase learning achievement of students so that at least 30% of teachers will pass the national competency test and at least 60% of TVET teachers will be using active teaching techniques
d. Develop modern quality curriculum and learning materials, relevant to labour market needs, to improve teaching and increase students’ learning achievements
e. Construct and equip 136 new schools and TVET centers and 24 dormitories according to modern TVET standards
f. Train administrative staff of TVET in planning, monitoring, reporting and office-related skills
g. Gradually reform and modernize TVET to address weaknesses in organization systems procedures and decision-making.

To align the NEIP with the ANDS’ directive to engage TVET closer to the private sector (employers and industry), the MOE included the following as strategies:

“The Ministry of Education, in cooperation with the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, will conduct a study of the labour market. The labour market needs assessment results will inform the TVET school curriculum and programs. A key strategy will be to encourage the private sector to invest in technical and vocational education. In close coordination with the ministries of finance and trade, the Ministry of Education will seek to establish a Memorandum of Understanding with major industries (e.g. business, mining, construction and manufacturing) to set-up training units within their industries (or in major companies) where Grade 9 graduates can enroll and obtain vocational training. Involvement of the industry and the business sector should play a vital role, inter alia in: (a) providing advice to the government and education providers on its skills needs; (b) participating in the development of standards, criteria and assessments; (c) providing job placements and recruitment opportunities for students; (d) providing industrial placements for teachers; and (e) assisting with the provision of equipment, tools and materials”.

NSDP is the de facto guiding policy document of MOLSAMD in its TVET activities. (The MOLSAMD did not have an agency plan similar to NESP or NEIP before 2011. It is currently developing its strategic plan for 2012-2014). The goal of the NSDP is to “contribute to the socio-economic recovery of Afghanistan through the development of a National Vocational Education and Training system that is responsive to labour market needs and provides Afghan men and women with knowledge and skills for decent work.” Ultimately, the NSDP aims to develop a fully functioning modern vocational education and training system managed by the National Vocational Education and Training Authority (NVETA). Figure below summarizes the strategic direction of NSDP.
NAPWA reminds everyone, particularly MOE and MOLSAMD, of the issues and challenges female face in education and training. These are: (a) gender disparities in school enrolment and retention rates; (b) lack of access and poor educational infrastructure; (c) insufficient female teachers and discriminatory education curricula; (d) increasing safety and security concerns; (e) social resistance to female education; and (f) insufficient access to accelerated learning and vocational training programs. The recommended interventions are alternative education, accelerated learning and vocational training opportunities for women on a larger scale. These programs should be based on market research and gender analysis. More importantly, NAPWA emphasizes the need for a “paradigm shift”. Training programs should stay away from quick-fix solutions reinforcing traditional skills for women that are often focused on low-paid stereotyped occupations such as tailoring, embroidery and handicrafts. Instead, new training initiatives should lead to larger-scale, longer-term and profit-oriented ventures.

2.2 Management and Governance

Decisions that shape the present and future of TVET in Afghanistan come from five government bodies. They are:

i. MOE, Deputy Ministry for TVET (DMTVET)
ii. MOLSAMD, General Directorate for TVET (GDTVET)
iii. National Skills Development Program (NSDP)
iv. Committee on Education and Skills Policy (CESP)
v. Human Resource Development Board (HRDB)
   • Technical Working Group on TVET (TWG-TVET)

DMTVET oversees all formal TVET conducted in TVET high schools (Grades 10-12) and TVET institutes (Grades 13-14). It has three departments, namely: i) Technical and Vocational Programs; ii) Vocational Teacher Education; and iii) Vocational Curriculum Development. It also supervises 142 public TVET high schools and institutes.

GDTVET operates a network of public TVET training centers that provide short-term skills training programs ranging from six to nine months. The trainees are unemployed youth and adults, illiterates, families of martyrs and the disabled, all between the ages 15 to 45.

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10 NAPWA, pp.98-99
11 NAPWA, p.101
NSDP has a Steering Committee that provides vision and leadership to the program. Eleven government ministries are represented in this Steering Committee and they generally meet every six months. The last Steering Committee meeting took place last February 8, 2012. A Project Implementation Unit functions as the secretariat of the Steering Committee and implementing arm of the NSDP.

CESP is a small group composed of key government ministries, MOE, MOLSAMD and Ministry of Higher Education (MOHE) and select donors, namely USAID, Government of Norway and World Bank. Together, they discuss the development of the Afghan National Qualifications Framework (ANQF) under which there are proposed six boards: (a) National Board of Higher Education; (b) National Board of Secondary Education; (c) National Board of Basic Education; (d) National Board of Islamic Education; (e) National Board of Literacy and Non-Formal Education; and (f) National Board of TVET.

HRDB is an education sector forum coordinating HRD issues between relevant government ministries (MOE, MOHE, MOLSAMD, MOWA and Ministry of Finance) and the development partners. As a high-level committee, HRDB plays an important role in developing well-coordinated education and training policies and ensuring effective implementation by the ministries.

The TWG on TVET is one of the six groups created by the HRDB. The composition and functions presented below are instructive on who the HRDB thinks should be involved and what should be done to organize the TVET sub-sector. In April 2011, the TWG on TVET created several task forces, namely: TVET Strategy, Teacher Training Coordination, Donor Coordination, Private Sector Involvement, and Curriculum Mapping.

The TWG on TVET has met several times but stopped in early 2012 due to difficulty of coordination between MOE and MOLSAMD.

**Table 1A. Composition: TWG on TVET**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ministries</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Education (MOE-DMTVET) – Co-chair</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled, (MOLSAMD) – Co-chair</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Skills Development Program (NSDP)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Higher Education (MOHE)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock (MAIL)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Statistical Office (CSO)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donors/International Partners</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>GIZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>JICA USAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>DCAE (Netherlands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFID</td>
<td>KOICA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ACOE</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Private Sector</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACCI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AISA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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14. From USAID notes: Workforce Development in Afghanistan, an informal summary of key data
Table 1B. Functions: TWG on TVET

A. Policy recommendations and technical advice
- To coordinate and guide the development of a National TVET Strategy and oversee its implementation
- To review and oversee the National TVET Strategy, develop an annual plan of operations for National Program 1
- To review and provide technical advice on proposed programs and projects
- To provide policy advice to the partners and providers on implementation of TVET programs
- To conduct regular reviews on program activities as basis for mutual learning and improving reform efforts
- To guide quality assurance, including mechanisms for the monitoring and evaluation of TVET providers

B. Alignment with strategies and programs of the government
- To discuss policy, programming, funding and alignment with ANDS/NPP benchmarks and National Priority Programs
- To provide policy advice on policy and implementation of the National Program 1
- To report regularly to the HRDB and align ministerial activities to implement the TVET program

C. Coordination, information sharing and resource mobilization
- To strengthen planning by creating a database of projects and identifying priorities for ongoing support
- To act as unbiased coordination body for the distribution of donor funds
- To work out clearly defined communication structures as basis for ongoing efficient coordination
- To act as information sharing floor for TVET: new policies, initiatives, research, challenges and lessons learned
- To recommend further research studies and capacity building programs to support the TVET system
- To develop and implement mechanisms for formal input of industry (employers, workers, private, public sector)
- To coordinate public outreach of the TVET programs.

2.3 TVET Providers
TVET is delivered in two ways (formal and non-formal) by five different types of TVET providers.

Table 2. TVET Providers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Provider type</th>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Delivery</th>
<th>Managed by</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public TVET Institutes</td>
<td>Grade 13-14</td>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>MOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public TVET High Schools</td>
<td>Grades 10-12</td>
<td>Formal</td>
<td>MOE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public TVET Training Centers</td>
<td>short-term (6-9 months)</td>
<td>Non-formal</td>
<td>MOLSAMD, NSDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private TVET Providers</td>
<td>Mixed of the above</td>
<td>Mixed formal and non-formal</td>
<td>Not all have contacts with MOE, MOLSAMD or NSDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO TVET Providers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15 From USAID notes: Workforce Development in Afghanistan, an informal summary of key data
16 The term “TVET provider” is more comprehensive than “TVET institution”. The latter refers to the schools, institutes and training centers with permanent buildings and training facilities. However, not all training programs take place inside TVET institutions. Many NGOs deliver their short-term training programs (e.g. tailoring and handicrafts) from one community center to another. This is possible because they do not extensive use equipment and only require basic tools.
Not all TVET providers can be called TVET institutions. There are NGOs that provide training but do not have training centers or facilities. NGOs are still able to deliver training because they mostly offer short-term, non-formal training programs (e.g., tailoring and handicrafts) that do not need extensive use of equipment.

No single ministry looks after the entire range of TVET providers. The MOE provided data only for public TVET high schools and institutes, while MOLSAMD has even more limited information on its network of public TVET centers. Not MOE or MOLSAMD has conducted extensive monitoring of the private and NGO TVET providers. This is crucial in the TVET sub-sector. Government is missing up to 80% of total TVET output by not covering the private sector and NGO TVET providers.

In 2009, NSDP made an attempt to have a comprehensive inventory of TVET providers. The result of the survey\textsuperscript{17} showed that majority of the TVET providers is not from the government but outside of it (67% private TVET providers).

In 2011, USAID conducted another survey\textsuperscript{18} as a preparatory activity for a new project called Afghanistan Workforce Development Project (AWDP). It was able to identify over 900 TVET providers coming from various sources, namely: prior surveys, firms registered with Afghanistan Investment Support Agency (AISA), list of training providers from NSDP, and from the Internet. A total of 419 TVET providers responded to the survey.

The MOE is mainly responsible for the growth of public TVET institutions. Between 2009 and 2011, the share of public TVET providers grew from 13% to 23% (18% MOE + 5% MOLSAMD),

\textsuperscript{17} Baseline Data for the Quality of TVET Provision in Afghanistan, p.10
\textsuperscript{18} Afghanistan Technical and Vocational Education Training (TVET) Providers Inventory, p.13
a likely result of the MOE’s intention in the NESP and NEIP to build new TVET high schools and institutes down to the district level. The MOE constructed an average of 38.5 new structures per year. The target of the MOE under the NEIP is to have 172 public TVET institutions (24 regional + 61 provincial + 87 district TVET schools). At this rate of construction, the MOE is bound to achieve its target.

**TVET Schools, Institutes**

![Graph 3. TVET Institutions under MOE](image)

In terms of geographical distribution, the construction of new public TVET institutions is certainly giving more opportunities (access) to the provincial population. This is a welcome development considering that 10 years ago (2002), nearly half of all public TVET institutions are based in Kabul. In 2011, 96% of TVET high schools (Grades 10-12) and 63% of TVET institutes (Grades 13-14) are in the provinces. The MOE is able to conduct monitoring visits and academic supervision to 90% of the public TVET institutions. Transportation and security problems are the main reasons for not reaching the remaining 10%.

The Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled (MOLSAMD) provided only a list of its training centers (see Annex 1). It was a challenge to find more information on the MOLSAMD training centers. Perhaps, the difficulty lies in ascertaining how many of them are still able to operate. One document alludes to this. It said “JICA established nine TVET institutes around the country in 2007. By 2009, these institutes had fallen into such disrepair that UNDP undertook refurbishing. Without a plan or resources for sustainability, the centers ceased operation shortly thereafter”\(^{19}\).

The Ministry of Higher Education (MOHE) is also proposing to establish “Community Colleges” to produce graduates or middle-level manpower with skills attuned to the needs of the industry. However, there is no agreement or decision that this will happen soon.

No other report was able to comment on the state or quality of the public TVET institutions but the 2009 NSDP survey may be able to provide a general idea on the overall quality of the various TVET providers. The NGO TVET providers were generally better than their public and private except in “support to students” where private TVET providers did better. The perfect score is 100.

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\(^{19}\) Afghanistan Technical and Vocational Education Training (TVET) Providers Inventory, p.7
2.4 Enrolment
Enrolment in public TVET institutions is seemingly growing. The average growth rate is 38% during the last two years. If this pace continues until 2013, MOE will exceed the NEIP target of 67,300 enrollees by almost 11,000 students.

Table 4. Female Share in Enrolment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TVET High Schools</th>
<th>TVET Institutes</th>
<th>Combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female enrolment</td>
<td>2,446</td>
<td>2,994</td>
<td>5,440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>23,191</td>
<td>17,892</td>
<td>41,083</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Female</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Public enrolment is only about one-third of total students in TVET (29%). To get this big picture, it is necessary to use different sources since neither the MOE nor MOLSAMD provided enrolment figures of private TVET and NGOs. The USAID study found that the draft National TVET Strategy estimated private sector enrolment about 150,000 and another 30,000 from the NGOs. Primary data from the USAID’s study had 138,000 students from 400 TVET, which means the estimate of the National TVET Strategic is very realistic. NSDP reported 7,020 individuals trained, of which 35% are female and MOLSAMD cited 26,480 beneficiaries from its short-term training programs. Data from both NSDP and MOLSAMD came from their respective 2011 Annual Progress Report.

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20 Afghanistan Technical and Vocational Education Training (TVET) Providers Inventory, p.12
21 As of 15 August 2011
2.5 Student Services

Ninety percent (90%) of TVET institutions under MOE have dormitories housing 10,532 students, which is equal to 26% of total enrolment in 2011. One of the oft cited reasons for girls’ lack of participation is lack of female dormitories as well as poor facilities. No females actually stayed in dormitories in 2010 and 2011. From 2009-2011, there were only 41 females (0.18%) out of a total of 22,729 students living in dormitories for free.

Six provinces were able to accommodate more than half of the students; 17 provinces accepting 25-50% of students; and 11 provinces absorbing less than 25% of enrolled students (see Table 8). Other TVET providers find other ways to help their students. MOLSAMD hires “marketing officers” to help training graduates find potential employers. ATVI teaches its students how to write resume and connect them with partner companies. Every year, ATVI organizes job fair inside the campus where companies can meet and hire graduating students. Soon, ATVI will put up a website where employers can search students available for employment. NGOs like Solidarite Afghan Belgique (SAB) provide trainees with tool kits, transportation allowance and training materials to ensure people have the necessary support to complete their training.

Table 5. Dorm Capacity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>% Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uruzan</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Takhar</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahor</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laghman</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapisa</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daikundi</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahazni</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farah</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badghis</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Herat</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wardak</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bamyan</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sare Pul</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunduz</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khost</td>
<td>52%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Panjsher</td>
<td>28%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zabul</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faryab</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helmand</td>
<td>27%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paktya</td>
<td>16%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Balkh</td>
<td>36%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kandahar</td>
<td>27%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paktika</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nooristan</td>
<td>33%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jawzjan</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paktika</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perwan</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kunar</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logar</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baghlan</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nimroz</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samangan</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badakshan</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.6 Graduates

Private and NGO TVET providers produce the biggest share (71%) of TVET outputs or graduates. MOLSAMD and NSDP outnumbered the outputs of MOE because non-formal TVET or short-term training programs produce more graduates than those in the formal system, where students stay in schools for two to three years (see Graph 9).

Public TVET institutions from MOE are producing very few graduates. The number of graduates from public TVET (MOE) in 2010 represents only 11% of the total 2009 TVET enrolment. It is merely 3% compared to TVET graduates (89,711) from 400 TVET institutions reported in the USAID Study.

Table 6. Graduates from TVET Institutions (MOE)\(^{22}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1,682</td>
<td>1,602</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>1,853</td>
<td>1,685</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2,457</td>
<td>2,234</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Tracking the number of graduates regularly allows TVET institutions to monitor the graduation rate. This indicator can provide feedback on the effectiveness of the training programs. Table below shows graduation rates (66% in 2011) from the Afghanistan Technical Vocational Institute (ATVI) but even more telling is the parity of graduation rates between males and females, which shows that the learning environment in the institution treats both gender equally.

### Table 7. ATVI Graduates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year (07/08)</th>
<th>Enrolment in ATVI</th>
<th>Graduates</th>
<th>Graduation rate</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007/08</td>
<td>629</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008/09</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/10</td>
<td>1,035</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>1,529</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2.7 Employment

Employment rate is the most important indicator in TVET. It is the best feedback on the quality of training programs. Only NSDP from public TVET tracked down the employment rate of their graduates. Employment rates from two of the private/NGO providers interviewed were included for comparison. It is verified if MOE follows the employability of graduates from TVET Institutes and High Schools.

### Table 8. Comparison of Reported Employment Rate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employment Rate of Graduates</th>
<th>Type of Provider</th>
<th>Type of training</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NSDP</td>
<td>75.3%</td>
<td>Public</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATVI</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>Private, NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAB</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>Private, NGO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NSDP graduates have high employment rate, which means that labour market is responding well to NSDP sponsored training programs. The employment rates based on the result of the 2011 NSDP graduate tracer study ranged from 61% (Ghor province) to as high as 98% (Faryab).

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23 In case of latest data not available, 2010 data was used as proxy
24 During this period, duration of ATVI courses was converted from one to two years.
### Table 9. Results of NSDP Graduate Tracer Study

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Training Provider</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>No of Trainees</th>
<th>Tracer Study Findings (Outcome Indicators)</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Employment rate</th>
<th>Av. Monthly Income (Af)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>ADVTP</td>
<td>Nimroz</td>
<td>210</td>
<td></td>
<td>70</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>4,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>HWO</td>
<td>Hirat</td>
<td>235</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>5,828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>EAC</td>
<td>Ghor</td>
<td>265</td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>VARA</td>
<td>Farah</td>
<td>140</td>
<td></td>
<td>110</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>1,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>PADA</td>
<td>Jawzjan</td>
<td>140</td>
<td></td>
<td>110</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>2,836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>USARSOO</td>
<td>Faryab</td>
<td>175</td>
<td></td>
<td>75</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>5,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>INTERSOS</td>
<td>Hirat</td>
<td>520</td>
<td></td>
<td>90</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>4,342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>CRDSA</td>
<td>Badghis</td>
<td>285</td>
<td></td>
<td>195</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>4,899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>SEO</td>
<td>Farah</td>
<td>270</td>
<td></td>
<td>270</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>540</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>2,260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>Ghor</td>
<td>173</td>
<td></td>
<td>57</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>3,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>HEWAD</td>
<td>Ghazni</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>375</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>4,314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Total/Average</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>2,413</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>1,382</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,795</strong></td>
<td><strong>75.3%</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,653</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NSDP training increases chances of people getting employed. Six months after training, 52% were still unemployed. After two years, the unemployment rate of the same group was down to 31% (see table below).

### Table 10. Employability of NSDP Graduates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Employed</th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Six months after training</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two years after training</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ATVI also conducts regular graduate tracer studies. Its cooperation with its partner companies, where many of the graduates have been employed, makes it easier to conduct the study. In 2008, employment rate of ATVI’s graduates was 70%. It improved to 75% the following year. Moreover, it found out that 10% of graduates pursued higher education while 12% started their own business. In general, 84% of female graduates eventually found employment in public, private and NGO sectors.

Solidarite Afghan Belgique (SAB) reported that 75% of its graduates found productive work either through employment or by starting their own business.

### 2.8 Budget

The share of TVET in total MOE budget is only 5% in 2011. Most of it (90%) spent on salaries. Development budget is intended for the improvement of the schools (e.g. building, workshop facilities, equipment and tools). However, opportunities are lost if expenditure rate stays at 51%. Overall expenditure rate of TVET budget is 75%. This is better than NSDP’s expenditure rate of only 43%.

### Table 11. NSDP Financial Data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NSDP Budget</th>
<th>1390</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Budget</td>
<td>7,249,985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expenditure</td>
<td>3,151,228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balance</td>
<td>4,098,756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Expenditure</td>
<td>43.47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

25 NSDP Annual Progress Report, 2011
26 NSDP Annual Progress Report, 2011
### Table 12. MOE Financial Information, Program 3, TVET

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1389</th>
<th>1390</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Afs.</td>
<td>USD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Budget</td>
<td>939,075,885</td>
<td>$19,362,389</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non salary items in OB</td>
<td>686,864,620</td>
<td>$14,162,157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OB Actual expenditure</td>
<td>64,455,495</td>
<td>$1,411,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development Budget</td>
<td>610,821,802</td>
<td>$12,594,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DB Actual expenditure</td>
<td>252,211,265</td>
<td>$5,200,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of MOE Total</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 2.9 Donors

Information regarding how many donors are involved in TVET and how much investments are going to the TVET sub-sector is very hard to find collected in one databank. Project information exists in different places. Some donors do not have problem sharing information; others don’t bother. As a result, there is an “imperfect market of information” where both government and donors make decisions based on incomplete data or facts. Figure below is an attempt to map the donor assistance to the TVET sub-sector. About nine donors were identified but it is possible a few more are missing. For example, CIDA has a project since 2007 (see below) but is not included in the illustration.

Illustrating the point of donor coordination, the report requested information from the development partners using a simple form. JICA and CIDA responded.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Donor</th>
<th>Project</th>
<th>Amount (USD)</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>System Devt.</th>
<th>Capacity Devt.</th>
<th>Service Delivery</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Afghan-Canadian Community Center (ACCC) Kandahar Sustainable Skills Program</td>
<td>588,000</td>
<td>2007-2013</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>GIZ-Kandahar Technical School Skills for Employment</td>
<td>1,500,000</td>
<td>2009-2013</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIDA</td>
<td>WUC-CARE Vocational Training for Afghan Women, support for CIDA funded Humanitarian Assistance for Women (HAWA)</td>
<td>4,900,000</td>
<td>2007-2011</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Vocational Training for Unemployed and Underemployed Males and Females</td>
<td>1,480,000</td>
<td>2010-2012</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>Skills Development Training for Neo-Literate Youth in Afghanistan</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>2010-2012</td>
<td></td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>Training of Trainers in TVET</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>2010-2011</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>Enhancement of Vocational Training</td>
<td></td>
<td>2009-2011</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Diagram 1: TVET Stakeholders and Engagement
3 Female teachers

The number of female teachers increased marginally in the education sector as a whole. Female representation in public TVET institutes improved, from 19% to 21% in 2010-2011, but decreased in public TVET high schools, from 22% to 20% during the same period.

Table 13. Male and Female TVET Teachers employed by MOE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Public TVET Institutes (Grades 13-14)</th>
<th>Public TVET High Schools (Grades 10-12)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In Samangan province there is almost parity between two genders. Only six other provinces had 20% or more female teacher representation in the total number of faculty. The rest of the country had 10% or less female teaching staff.

Table 14. Top Seven Provinces with Female Teachers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Female Teacher Representation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Samangan</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kunduz</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Balkh</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Jawzjan</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Herat</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Daikundi</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a general observation, teacher reinforcement is most urgently needed in Badghis province, where there is only one teacher for every 61 students. The MOE also needs to address teacher demand in nine other provinces (Takhar to Farah) where there are 30 or more students for every one teacher.
4 Issues and Analysis

Our struggles are the short-term lessons we learn to achieve long-term success\(^2\).

The issues identified here are the ones that stood out during the period of review. Some merely repeat what has been said in the past mainly because they need to be reminded and emphasized. There are new issues too. They consider recent developments and anticipate future scenario.

4.1 Lack of Coordination

It is easy to conclude that the lack of coordination in the TVET subsector is a result of the turf war between two government ministries. However, if one considers their perspective, one will understand that they are merely following their respective mandates: MOE responsible for delivering formal TVET to young people still in the education system, while MOLSAMD provides non-formal TVET or short-term training to the illiterate, out-of-school youth, unemployed, families of martyrs and the disabled.

Comparing formal and non-formal TVET is like comparing apples and oranges. It is not possible to say one is better than the other. They are both healthy fruits but they came from different trees. In the same manner, both may refer to TVET but they serve different clienteles and also delivered in a different way. Any attempt to unite them would only seem, from the point of view of the ministries, illogical and contrary to their mandate. Hence, it is futile to unite the TVET subsector if it means one ministry yielding to the other for the sake of unity. It is futile because it will not happen.

The lack of coordination alluded here is the inability of the ministries to operate under the same rules. In other words, the ministries developed their own TVET system according to what they think is right. Operating in this environment is like participating in a game where there are many players but each one will play according to their own rules. A game with no

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\(^2\) Simon Sinek
system will definitely result to chaos. That is now the situation of the TVET subsector in Afghanistan.

At present TVET policies and strategies are present in at least give government plans. Several government bodies are making decisions on the TVET subsector. Who will ensure consistency of decisions and actions? The HRDB created the TWG on TVET with MOE and MOLSAMD as co-chairs. Due to conflicting interests, the group has not met that often. What is needed is a credible body (a TWG can be easily dismissed by the ministry) that would act as a neutral broker or referee. Its task is to ensure that players play the game with a common rule to follow. In TVET, that common rule is the adherence to “quality”.

4.2 Funding Concern

The World Bank paper “Transition in Afghanistan: Looking Beyond 2014” discusses that education’s operation and maintenance (O&M) budget is at high-risk. This can happen if government prioritizes security over delivery of social services such as education.

At present, TVET share in education budget is already very low (5%). Of the total budget allocated to TVET, most of it goes to salaries (46%) and developmental activities (49%) like building new schools. Only 5% is left for operation and maintenance.

The pressure on TVET builds at the same time as not only the number of students increase but also the number of TVET institutes and high schools. When the projected scenario of reduced government funding happens after 2014, it might not be enough to sustain the operations of the public TVET institutions and worst there might be nothing left to pursue TVET activities not related to service delivery such as continuing the reforms such as developing ANQF and NOSS, accreditation and assessment, etc.

For sure, donors will still be around to support the TVET subsector and its reform initiatives, but it would be more liberating to find and secure an alternative source of funding if only to ensure minimum disruption and a sustainable future for the system.

4.3 Reform Gestation

All reforms take time. Proposals to organize the TVET subsector, to move the system from supply to demand-driven TVET, to ensure all training programs follow national standards, to require all TVET providers to undergo accreditation, to assess all TVET graduates and give them the equivalent certification of skills, all these will take time for people to understand and appreciate.

The government needs to stand firm on its decision. The government must be the first to be convinced that this is the right path to follow. The policy and decision-makers must remain committed and be able to convey to other TVET stakeholders that reform is taking place.

At the same time, the TVET subsector must continuously find ways to improve the system; find innovations and share them to as many institutions and providers as possible. If there are emerging issues and challenges, the government must always find a way to address them. These things are possible to do and achieve if there is a regular venue that gathers TVET stakeholders, where government can present its vision, affirm its commitment to continue the reforms and allows various stakeholder to share experiences, best practices and innovations.

4.4 Low Status of TVET

TVET subsector needs a paradigm shift. In the minds of many Afghan (as in many other parts of the world), TVET is second-class education. This may be one reason why many students take the Kankor examination, their ultimate aim being to enter university. Even existing students in TVET institutes and high schools would express their desire to continue their studies in a higher education institution.
The existing conditions in many TVET institutions are not helping change this second-class image of TVET. The inability to provide practical skills; the focus on books and lectures; the TVET teachers who mainly have academic background with no technical or industrial experience – they all negate the vision of an “education sector that engenders a healthy workforce with relevant skills and knowledge” as key to Afghanistan’s long-term economic growth.

The government would save a lot of money by accepting that some TVET high schools and institutes are really operating not very different from a general high school. The schools and their teachers would be cheating their students by convincing them they can learn practical skills by just sitting inside the classroom without having the chance to learn how to use tools and equipment.

If government is serious on improving the image of TVET, it should find a way how to hire more teachers with practical skills, install workshops in schools, provide equipment and tools and perhaps change people’s negative impression on TVET by sending positive messages that the government means serious business in TVET.

4.5 Analysis Paralysis

Over a span of three years, the TVET subsector has witnessed three reviews and three national surveys – all of which contain critical analysis of the situation and the issues preventing development, and of course, accompanying recommendations to government policymakers. What major decision or policy has come out as a result of these studies? As one of the reports rightly pointed out: “the principal recommendation should read -- fewer words more action”.

Perhaps by now, the pattern has become familiar to everyone. Government and donors will agree to have a study or review. Consultants will arrive, conduct interviews; write their reports and go. After a few years, the same process will be repeated. No major decision made, no major action taken. This is the exact definition of “analysis paralysis”. HRDB should look back and revisit these reports and recommendations. Many of them are still valid. Once an agreement is reached on which actions to take, it should make a serious resolution not to take another TVET subsector study until significant changes have taken place. Otherwise, it will have the same findings and repeating the same recommendations.

4.6 Lack of local TVET experts

One of the challenges in this Education Joint Sector Review is the noticeable absence of a counterpart from the key ministries. Usually, a government will assign a focal person or even a team to ensure data needs are satisfied or the proper context of the situations is explained. These counterparts may not be international experts but they are knowledgeable enough of the situation in their country, much more to the sector they are involved in. Yet one cannot help but notice the gap in the capacity of both the institution and individuals. Requested data are incomplete; data are missing; data not consistent appearing in various reports; data analysis not incisive enough to reflect the actual situation in the field, etc.

Understandably, this is essentially an issue of institutional capacity that is necessary to have stability and sustainability in the government in the near future. To develop institutional capacity means training a cadre or group of people that would mostly likely remain and become leaders and officers themselves in the future. It is a necessary investment that could have a long-term impact on the future success of the TVET subsector. The hope eventually is to have these local TVET experts reduce or even remove dependence on external consultants because they themselves can do the job.

28 Sachsse, Michael, “Towards a Viable National Vocational Education and Training System”, p.3
4.7 Female Teachers

It is true there are not many female teachers in TVET. Some say it is because of the technical nature of the courses that women are not interested which naturally is a prejudicial statement, relatively sexist in its nature, and globally empirically acknowledged to be untrue. This also covers cultures of similar composition as the Afghan culture(s).

A group of 26 teacher education students (all female) was asked if how many of them would be interested to teach in TVET institutes or high schools. A little more than half raised their hand. The simple experiment shows that given opportunity there is willingness among women to teach technical subjects. Opportunity however is a problem. There is always a demand for female teachers but the location of the schools, often in another district or in the next province, makes it difficult for the teachers and their families to be separated. There is an incentive to compensate those who teach away from their homes but in reality nothing is given.

Community members themselves find ways to solve lack of teachers. According to an interview, communities encourage young women to study in teacher education institutes so they could eventually teach in nearby schools. This way they are likely to stay and teach for a long time.

To teach TVET, teachers need to take an examination. They also need to have high grades (75-80%) when they graduated as a requirement. The problem, however, is that most of these may already be teaching in universities or worst not interested in TVET. Some teachers were sent abroad to receive training and become lead or master teachers in TVET institutions. Again, the grade requirement is serving as a barrier because teacher applicants could not reach that score when they studied in other countries.

Involving the communities and removing the grade barrier have the potential to increase number of teachers, especially females. However, they have not addressed a more serious problem of teachers in TVET institutions. This is the complete lack of practical experience and know-how to teach a skill.

To remedy this, ATVI hired two sets of teachers. One set, with bachelor degrees, teach theory in the classroom. The other set, technicians with industry work experience, train students in the workshops. The result is a healthy balance between theory and practice, each one complementing the other.

ATVI also invites visiting experts who come from the various companies. These industry experts provide on-the-ground reality to the students. By exposing students to different experts, they get multiple perspectives about the world of work.

In addition to experts coming from big companies, the bazaars and industry associations are also potential source to find, recruit or invite practical teachers to teach in TVET institutions.

4.8 Deprived institutions

While not all public TVET institutions are in a state of disrepair, many of those located in the provinces, away from Kabul, suffer serious deficiencies that they are TVET institutions by name only. According to an interview, this applies to many agricultural schools. The situation was later confirmed first-hand when the Education Joint Sector Review team conducted field visits. These schools practically have:

- No workshop facilities
- No equipment
- No tools
- No link to labour market or local companies
- No transportation for students
- No student services
- No autonomy from the central government
- No female teachers
5 Recommendations

1. Establish ANQF and NVETB to move TVET forward

The Afghanistan National Qualifications Framework (ANQF) and the National Vocational Education and Training Board (NVETB) will signal a new beginning for the TVET sub-sector. All TVET providers are expected to follow the same national training standards. The MOE, MOLSAMD and other government agencies involved in training will recognize a single coordinator for the TVET sub-sector. To delay the ANQF and NVETB means to remain in the status quo. The impasse between MOE-DMTVET, MOLSAMD and NSDP will continue to hamper the development of TVET. The HRDB, as a high-level collective body looking at the general interests of the education and training sector (and beyond ministerial agenda), should support the Committee on Education and Skills Policy (CESP) and endorse the immediate legislation of ANQF and NVETB.

There should be no more excuses to pursue TVET individually. The ANQF will provide a coherent framework where both formal and non-formal delivery of TVET will co-exist. Students may come from different TVET providers; however, they will undergo a common assessment and certification system. This quality assurance system will unite or bind TVET together.

Meanwhile, the NVETB becomes TVET highest policymaking body and think-tank at the same time. The MOE-DMTVET and MOLSAMD will continue to manage TVET High Schools/Institutes and Training Centres, respectively, but have to recognize the NVETB’s mandate as the overall TVET coordinator (which includes the development of a National TVET Strategy or Master Plan). This means MOE and MOLSAMD will have to give up some policymaking powers with respect to the development of the TVET system. As key members of the NVETB, MOE and MOLSAMD, of course, will be part of every decision making process. The NSDP will either be absorbed or dismantled upon creation of the NVETB. Private sector representation (employer groups, industry associations, private and NGO TVET providers) should be given importance in the composition of the NVETB membership.

2. Set-up ASDF to sustain TVET beyond 2014

Donors should set aside a portion of their financial assistance to the TVET sub-sector to set-up the Afghanistan Skills Development Fund (ASDF). It will be a form of safety net for TVET, especially if the projected budget shortfall becomes true after 2014.

The report proposes to the HRDB to recommend ASDF as one of the agenda during the Donors’ Conference in Tokyo, Japan. International donors are strongly encouraged to set-up ASDF because it will assure funding for the TVET sector. In times of budget crisis, TVET will almost certainly lose to General, Islamic or even Higher Education. The ASDF will particularly be useful for two important items: activities to support continuation of TVET reforms and support to the operations of training providers, especially public ones to avoid closing them down.

Other countries have established similar funding scheme to reduce financial dependence on government, raise contributions from employers and companies, and make funding available as fast as possible for mainly for training of workers but also for research and capacity building. Annex A provides a collection of Internet resources on skills development fund from other countries.

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29 Simon Sinek
3. **Renew commitment during Annual TVET conference**

The Annual TVET Conference is a great opportunity to bring spotlight on the role and importance of having skilled workforce in the long-term economic development of Afghanistan. It is a time to bring government and stakeholders together where everyone can renew their commitment to the country. Everybody needs to play an active role to improve TVET sub-sector.

- The NVETB can report on the state of the TVET sub-sector and outline the policy direction, goals and strategies for the next year
- The MOE and MOLSAMD can inform of new initiatives for both public and private TVET providers to achieve training targets
- The employers and industry associations can announce expansion of partnership with government and training providers
- Model TVET Providers can share their innovations and best practices to other institutions.

4. **Use mass media to make TVET familiar to every Afghan**

The government must take advantage of available tools and technology to promote TVET among its citizens. Afghanistan has 17.5 million mobile subscribers, which is more than half of the population. There are about one million Internet users, at least 50 television channels and another 50 radio stations.

It is not enough to build TVET institutions, train teachers and develop new curricula. People need to know these initiatives exist. People need to be convinced that TVET is useful. Only then will they flock to the nearest TVET providers in their community and seek training.

Media can help. It can bring greater awareness on government’s programs to provide skills and employment to the people. This awareness can also improve people’s negative impression or attitude towards TVET, usually regarded as second-class education. Media can also become an effective tool for recruiting more students and teachers into TVET.

In Chile, Ernesto Schiefelbein, former Minister of Education in the 1990s, decided to “educate” the media and explained to them the importance of reforming the education sector. He had to do this after he realized that people did not care or were not concerned enough on the education problems of the country. Media started talking about education, which resulted to greater awareness among the people. Soon the Minister got his wish to get more people involved in the education reform process.

In Afghanistan, both government and donors can productively use media to:

- Promote model TVET institutions so that people and other institutions will look up to them
- Share success stories of TVET graduates, especially women so they will serve as inspiration to others
- Provide career planning advices, especially to women and youth using the results of labour market studies and direct feedback from employers and industry associations
- Inform people to attend annual TVET conference.

5. **Avoid analysis paralysis through better knowledge management**

While waiting for the creation of the NVETB to eventually become the think-tank for the TVET sub-sector, the HRDB should temporarily assign a “Knowledge Manager” for TVET. That

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30 See “Chile: Generating Social Consensus for a Long-Term Reform of Education” by Ernesto Schiefelbein in *Prospects* Volume XXVII, no. 4, December 1997
person or organization will have two basic assignments: (a) collect all relevant information on TVET such as researches, surveys, labour studies, sector reviews, consultant reports and statistics; and (b) put them together in a website or portal where everyone (government, donors, researchers, consultants, TVET administrators, employers, industry associations and general public) can access them.

These resources were meant to guide policy and decision-making of the government, donors and other TVET stakeholders. They will not be serving their purpose if their circulation is limited to a few or worst hidden or neglected until they are forgotten. Hopefully, through better management of TVET resources, the need to commission similar work in the future will be reduced if not entirely avoided. Below are some useful documents worth sharing to the HRDB and other TVET stakeholders:

- **a. Baseline on TVET Schools and Institutes** GIZ commissioned study, February 2012
- **b. Afghanistan TVET Providers Inventory** USAID commissioned study, November 2011
- **c. Agricultural TVET: Improving Agricultural Education in Afghanistan** Wageningen UR Centre for Development Innovation, September 2011
- **d. Workforce Development in Afghanistan: Informal Summary of Key Data** Cristina Caltagirone, May 2011
- **e. USAID TVET Sector Activities and Resources** Cristina Caltagirone, May 2011
- **f. Towards a Viable National Vocational Education and Training System** Michael Sachsse, August 2010
- **g. Afghanistan Education Sector Analysis** Adam Smith International, June 2010
- **h. Baseline Data for the Quality of TVET Provision in Afghanistan** NSDP commissioned study, May 2009
- **i. TVET in Afghanistan: An Overview** Downloaded from CESP website, no date

6. **Develop a program to train cadre of local TVET experts**

   The proposal is to develop a short course (e.g. two weeks to one month) on TVET planning and management. This course should be implemented twice a year. It should be customized based on the specific needs of MOE, MOLSAMD, NSDP, TVET administrators and eventually including NVETB. The training should target young and promising staff, who can be future leaders in the TVET sub-sector. This will build internal capacity as well as reduce dependence on external consultants. UNESCO-IIEP, GIZ and Colombo Plan Staff College can help in the development and even implementation of the program.

   Some of the topics that the training should consider:
   - TVET planning and research
   - National Qualifications Framework
   - Skills Development Fund
   - Market-driven training
   - Governance and management of TVET institutions
   - Master plan development
   - Project proposal development

7. **Revamp hiring policy of TVET teachers**

   There is a need to revamp MOE’s hiring policy on TVET teachers. The intention to require a score of 75-80% is not bring the desired result – hiring of quality teachers. On the contrary, this same policy has prevented employment of teachers willing to work in TVET institutions, some of them were even trained in other countries for this purpose.
There is a need to rethink policy the geographical distribution or assignment of teachers. With financial incentives almost negligible to nothing to compensate teachers teaching in far-flung schools or institutes, the ones that remain are mostly the teachers from that area. It appears that the communities play an active role in encouraging members to become a teacher to teach in nearby schools.

There is a need to attract industry practitioners from big companies down to the bazaars. They can teach part-time (e.g. visiting expert or lecturer) or full-time in TVET institutions. They will bring a lot of practical experience and provide a good balance between theory and practice in TVET institutions. This idea is not exactly foreign to Afghanistan. ATVI invites industry experts as visiting lecturers. ANIM gets foreign teachers to teach Western and classical music.

To become full-time TVET teachers, industry practitioners should undergo six-month course on TVET pedagogy. Making it longer might discourage interested applicants. MOE-DMTVET can develop and implement the course. The TVET sub-sector has nothing to lose and everything to gain taking up this strategy.

8. **Build a network of model TVET institutions**

Success breeds success. It is based on the “principle that if you teach someone how to be successful they will become successful and they will teach others to become successful”31.

The success of the TVET sub-sector does not depend on the ability of the government to build public TVET institutions in all regions, provinces and districts. In fact, they can potentially waste donors’ resources if these institutions are not sustained by government’s budget in the future.

The real success of the TVET sub-sector depends on the number of model TVET institutions throughout the country. Kabul has two good examples. The Afghanistan National Institute of Music (ANIM) and Afghanistan Technical Vocational Institute (ATVI) set the standards for public and private TVET institutions. Every year, thousands of students aspire to enter and study in these institutions. They know what quality education can bring to their future. Employers want their graduates. They trust these institutions have prepared their students well for the world of work. Their reputation of being model institutions has made it easy for donors to support them. As a result, these two institutions do not need government money to produce quality outputs.

The government can identify other model TVET institutions by using the assessment criteria set by the Asia-Pacific Accreditation Certification Commission (APACC). These criteria assess the institution’s performance in seven areas, namely:

a. Governance and Management  
b. Teaching and Learning  
c. Faculty and Staff  
d. Research and Development  
e. Extension, consultancy and linkages  
f. Resources  
g. Support for Students

During the annual TVET conference, government can announce “new model TVET institutions”. The aim is to eventually have at least one model institution per province that will serve as “big brother” to other TVET institutions existing in the area. Government, possibly with support from donors, can provide financial incentives to add more excitement and motivation to the institutions.

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31 See [http://www.successbreedssuccess.net/history.htm](http://www.successbreedssuccess.net/history.htm)
Government should also grant “autonomy” to the model institutions (e.g. ability to generate and keep financial resources; create its own school board; independence in hiring school managers and teachers) since they have already demonstrated they can look after their own development. This will allow government to focus its supervisory powers on developing capability of other TVET institutions.

9. **Provide tools for all TVET students**

Give them books, they will learn to read. Give them pens, they will learn to write. Give them tools, they will use it for work. TVET students cannot become skilled by merely reading books and listening to lectures. They need to practice and master their tools. Even if their school does not provide sufficient time for “practice” especially if there are no “workshop facilities” in the institution, students are likely to use their tools at home and in their community. The good ones will eventually develop skills by using their tools. Once noticed, the local businesses may hire them or at least the students can earn some money by offering their service to the community. Buying the tools is a small price to pay compared to maintaining hundreds of public TVET institutions that are unable to provide practical skills to their students.

10. **Make school-to-work mandatory**

The ultimate objective of training is not to give people diploma; it is to give them jobs. The reputation of TVET is often tarnished when TVET graduates get frustrated because they can’t find work. The School-to-Work (STW) Transition Program addresses this glaring gap. The aim is to reduce time for searching jobs and if possible, make employers run after the students even before they graduate. The STW Transition Program essentially encourages TVET institutions to find partner companies that are willing to participate in any or all of the following activities:

   a. **Job Fairs** – companies come to the school to advertise job vacancies and find recruits;
   b. **On-the-Job Training (OJT) or Apprenticeship** – company and school agree on a program where students spend time in the actual workplace to complement what has been learned in the classroom and workshop;
   c. **Career Counseling** – school and company share “tips” to help students decide on their career path and provide practical advice on developing Resume and cover letters, submitting work applications and preparing for job interviews;
   d. **Company field visits** – teacher brings students to the company to bring reality to the classroom discussion; company supervisor explains actual working scenario;
   e. **Graduate Tracer Study (GTS)** – school track their graduates to know their employment status and get their feedback to improve relevance of training programs
   f. **Employers’ Feedback** – school and companies discuss on the performance of graduates who are now working in the companies and explore areas for improvement in the preparation of students; and
   g. **Visiting Industry Experts** – companies send “industry experts” in school to speak and provide industry perspective on topics related to the curriculum; school and companies talk in advance when an industry expert will be needed during the course of study.
There are existing practices of STW in Afghanistan. MOLSAMD has “Marketing Officers” who match short-term training graduates with companies looking for skilled workers. The NGOs scan “demand for skilled workers” among local companies (bazaars) before they provide training because they want to avoid producing skilled people who can’t find jobs. The ATVI maintains good relationship with several companies that participate in regular jobs fairs, send representatives to help update the curriculum; give feedback on performance of ATVI graduates. There are also discussions on the possibility of OJT and apprenticeships for ATVI students in the future. ATVI also conducts regular graduate tracer studies.

The government can use the ASDF to encourage TVET institutions to participate in the STW Transition Program. Any TVET institution (public, private or NGO) can submit project proposals that address two important criteria: i) activities that will facilitate the smooth school-to-work transition of their graduates; and ii) willing participation of partner companies in the implementation of STW activities.

Participation in this program helps the schools in two ways. It can improve the relevance of training programs to address the actual needs of their partner companies, which can lead to increased chances of their graduates getting hired. For companies willing to become partners of the TVET institutions, they can influence customization of training programs according to needs of the companies, and have the assurance of a steady supply of skilled graduates.
Annex 1 List of MOLSAMD Training Centres

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Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled, Afghanistan, National Skills Development Program (NSDP). “NSDP 2011 Progress Report”
Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled, National Skills Development Program (NSDP), Ministry of Education, Afghanistan, Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Deutsche Gesellschaft fur Internationale Zussamenarbeit (GIZ). 7-9 May 2012. First National TVET Exhibition (brochure)
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Wageningen UR Centre for Development Innovation and People In Need. 23 September 2011. “Agricultural TVET: Improving Agricultural Education in Afghanistan”

Annex 3. Websites Consulted
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Committee on Education and Skills Policy (CESP) www.cesp.gov.af
Ministry of Education (MOE) www.moe.gov.af
National Skills Development Program (NSDP) www.nsdp.gov.af

Annex 4. List of Meetings
1. Dr. Marghala Khara
   Director of Cultural Affairs
   Ministry of Women’s Affairs
   Date of meeting: 6 May 2012
   Director of Monitoring and Evaluation
   Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled
   sakhi_khairi@yahoo.com
2. Sakhi Ahmed “Khairi”
   Date of meeting: 6 May 2012
3. Zabibullah “Salik”
   General Manager of Monitoring and Evaluation
   Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled
   zabibullah@yahoo.com
   Date of meeting: 6 May 2012

4. Fred Hayward
   Senior Higher Education Consultant
   Afghanistan Higher Education Project
   F Hayward@hep-af.org
   Date of meeting: 7 May 2012

5. Muftabla Hedayet
   Higher Education and Training Coordinator
   Afghanistan Higher Education Project
   M Hedayet@hep-af.org
   Date of meeting: 7 May 2012

6. Martine van der Does
   Second Secretary Development Cooperation
   Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
   Martine-vander.does@minbuza.nl
   Date of meeting: 7 May 2012

7. Azer Jebran
   Director, Business Development Services
   Afghanistan Chamber of Commerce and Industries (ACCI)
   azer.jebran@acci.org.af
   Date of meeting: 8 May 2012

8. Zubair-Ud-Din Kerami
   Deputy Minister for Labour
   Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled
   zubair.kerami@gmail.com
   Date of meeting: 9 May 2012

9. Dr. Mohammad Salim “Mastoor”
   Director General, Policy and Planning
   Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled
   s.mastoor@gmail.com
   Date of meeting: 9 May 2012

10. Niels Kauffman
    Education Officer
    USAID-Kabul
    nkauffman@usaid.gov
    Date of meeting: 10 May 2012

11. Karen Coats
    Programs Design Advisor
    Policy and Planning Office
    Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled
    karen.coats@ctapafghanistan.org
    Date of meeting: 12 May 2012

12. Dr. Syed Aminullah “Alizai”
    Program Director (former)
    National Skills Development Program
    Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled
    aminullah.alizai@nsdp.gov.af
    Date of meeting: 12 May 2012

13. Jana Gul “Hanify”
    Program Officer
    National Skills Development Program
    Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled
    jhanify@nsdp.gov.af
    Date of meeting: 12 May 2012

14. Zekrulla Taibi
    Policy and Programs Director
    Deputy Ministry of TVET
    Ministry of Education
    zekrulla.taibi@gmail.com
    Date of meeting: 12 May 2012

15. Mohamad Baqir Rezaie
    Head of Private Sector and External Relation Development
    Department of Policy and Programs Development Directorate
    Deputy Ministry of TVET
    Ministry of Education
    rezaie.baqir@gmail.com
    Date of meeting: 12 May 2012

16. Noorullah Amani
    Strategic Planning Manager of Planning
    Department of Policy and Programs Development Directorate
    Deputy Ministry of TVET
    Ministry of Education
    noorullah.amani@yahoo.com
    Date of meeting: 12 May 2012

17. Bappadipta Chakravarty
    Sr. Institutional Development Specialist
    Education Sector Unit, Human Development Department
    Afghanistan Country Office, South Asia Region
    The World Bank
    bchakravarty@worldbank.org
    Date of meeting: 13 May 2012

18. Robert T. Raab
    Curriculum Development Advisor
    Agriculture TVET Project
    Wageningen UR, Centre for Development Innovation
    rob.agtvet@gmail.com
    Date of meeting: 14 May 2012

19. Elina Silen
    Advisor, New Business Development and Communications
    Date of meeting: 14 May 2012
20. S. Jalaluddin Shah  
Program Director  
Norwegian Afghanistan Committee (NAC)  
elina.silen@nacaf.org  
Date of meeting: 17 May 2012

21. Roya Mohmand  
Education Manager  
Norwegian Afghanistan Committee (NAC)  
naceducation@nacaf.org  
Date of meeting: 17 May 2012

22. Dr. Ahmad Nasir Sarmast  
Director and Founder  
Afghanistan National Institute of Music  
ahmad.sarmast@adm.monash.edu.au  
Date of meeting: 21 May 2012

23. Dr. Enayatullah “Mayel”  
National Program Coordinator  
National Skills Development Program  
Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled  
e.mayel@nsdp.gov.af  
Date of meeting: 27 May 2012

24. Mohammad Asif “Stanikzai”  
Monitoring and Evaluation Manager  
National Skills Development Program  
Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled  
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Date of meeting: 27 May 2012

25. Myron Mageto  
TVET and Labour Liaison  
ISAF Stability/Development International Security Assistance Force  
myron.maget@hq.isaf.nato.int  
Date of meeting: 27 May 2012

26. Abdul Halim Halim  
Academic Deputy Director  
Afghanistan Technical Vocational Institute  
ahlim_halime@yahoo.com  
Date of meeting: 28 May 2012

27. Masood Sakhi  
Business Development Manager  
Afghanistan Technical Vocational Institute  
masoudsakhi@gmail.com  
Date of meeting: 29 May 2012

28. Dr. Gustav Reier  
Head of Program  
Promotion of Technical Vocational Education & Training (TVET) in Afghanistan  
gustav.reier@giz.de  
Date of meeting: 30 May 2012

29. Dr. Mohamed Rafiq Sharifi  
Executive Director  
Solidarite Afghanistan Belgique  
sab.exdir@gmail.com  
Date of meeting: 30 May 2012

30. Marina Coblentz  
Transition Director  
Solidarite Afghanistan Belgique  
sab.trdr@gmail.com  
Date of meeting: 30 May 2012

31. Sultan Sekarder  
Operation Manager  
Solidarite Afghanistan Belgique  
sab.opm@gmail.com  
Date of meeting: 30 May 2012

32. Abdul Moqim ‘Halimi”  
Panjsher Chief of Education  
Ministry of Education  
a.moqimhalimi@yahoo.com  
Date of meeting: 4 June 2012

Annex 4. List of Events

1. First National TVET Exhibition  
7-9 May 2012, Afghanistan-Korea Vocation Training Center Afshar-e-silo, Kabul  
Date of visit: 8 May 2012

2. Human Resource Development Board Meeting  
Conference room of Minister Ministry of Education  
Date of meeting: 21 May 2012

3. Field Visit to Panjsher Province  
Mission date: 4-5 June 2012